In one standard sense, defeasibility is a feature of inferences, and one that seems to defy classical first order logic: An inference is defeasible when its putative conclusion is rendered doubtful by the addition of premises (thus violating monotonicity). The main argument of this paper is that certain types of inferences are defeasible in ways that render the putative conclusion genuinely indeterminate. The discussion, and most of the examples, focus on pragmatic inferences, legal inferences and on some overlapping cases, that is, cases in which legal defeasibility is actually a matter of pragmatics. I also argue that legal presumptions and the open-endedness of possible exceptions to legal rules behave differently, and are not susceptible to the kind of defeasibility discussed here. The upshot of the discussion is to show that defeasibility in law sometimes generates a genuine kind of legal indeterminacy. From a legal point of view, the conclusion would be neither here nor there. In such cases, decision-makers must make their judgments on the basis of considerations not dictated by the relevant law.
saying, "You know, they never met while in Paris." So now you know that they did not go there together. 1 The question of whether all defeasible inferences are non-monotonic is a highly contentious issue and I will not attempt to resolve it here.
2 I will certainly assume that many of them are. But, in any case, it is quite obvious that part of what allows for the possibility of defeasibility of an inference consists in the fact that the inference contains some typicality premise. The inference from "Tweety is a bird" to the conclusion that "Tweety can fly" is premised on the assumption that birds typically can fly; most of them fly, or, by and large, birds fly, or something along those lines. Similarly, the inference from "X intentionally killed person Y" to the conclusion that "X committed murder" is based on the premise that typically, under normal conditions, etc., intentional killing of a person is murder. The inference is defeated when some additional piece of information (e.g., that Tweety is an ostrich, or that X acted in self-defense) demonstrates that the typicality premise fails on this occasion.
Epistemologists have long identified two types of defeat: rebutting and undercutting. A rebutting defeat is one in which the additional (henceforth: superseding)
premise to a prima facie warranted inference is such that it negates the conclusion of the inference. The superseding premise to "Tweety is a bird," that "Tweety is an ostrich," is such that it simply negates the conclusion that "Tweety can fly"; ostriches cannot fly.
Hence it is a rebutting defeat. In other cases, however, the superseding premise might be such that it undermines the initial evidence we had for the conclusion. For example, suppose an object in front of me looks red. Under normal conditions what looks red is red, and thus I may conclude that the object is red. However, suppose I learn the superseding fact that I was given a drug that makes me see everything in red. This superseding premise undercuts my evidence for concluding that the object in front of me is red.
Notice that it does not necessarily negate the conclusion that the object is red; for all I 1 Notice that these conclusion reversals can go on for a while; suppose I add "they separated as soon as they arrived at the airport," so now you would realize that they did go together after all. 2 Probabilistic reasoning, such as Bayesian epistemology, is in many cases the main alternative model, and it is sometimes very difficult to nail down the boundaries between inferences susceptible to non-monotonic logic and those that are instances of credence adaptations.
know, it might be red. What is defeated here is the reliability of the initial evidence I had for concluding that the object is red. These are called undercutting defeats. 3 My main argument in this paper is that, at least in the practical domain, in addition to rebutting and undercutting defeats, a third type of defeat exists, which I will label conflicting defeats: cases in which the superseding premise renders the initial inference genuinely indeterminate. A conflicting defeat neither negates the conclusion nor undercuts the initial evidence for it. The defeasibility in such cases consists in the fact that it becomes indeterminate whether the putative conclusion follows or not -namely, it is a conclusion that one would not be unreasonable to deny, nor unreasonable to affirm.
My discussion, and most of the examples, will focus on pragmatic inferences, legal inferences and on some overlapping cases, that is, cases in which legal defeasibility is actually a matter of pragmatics. The upshot of this discussion is to show that defeasibility in law sometimes generates a genuine kind of legal indeterminacy. From a legal point of view, the conclusion would be neither here nor there. In such cases, decision-makers must make their judgments on the basis of considerations not dictated by the relevant law.
Pragmatic Defeasibility
The general defeasibility of pragmatic inferences is widely recognized by linguists and philosophers of language. Perhaps less widely recognized is that the defeasibility of pragmatic inferences probably shows that their underlying logic is non-monotonic. 4 But the non-monotonic logic that may apply here is not my concern. given occasion of speech is often pragmatically enriched content, not fully determined by semantic and syntactical determinants. Therefore, for our purposes, the distinction between pragmatic inferences that contribute to the asserted content of an utterance on a given occasion of speech, and those which concern implications beyond what is said, will be of little consequence. I will not try to be very precise about this.
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The second modification may be a bit more controversial and more relevant to our concerns. Suppose a speaker S utters a sentence P in context C, thereby conversationally implicating that Q. There are probably two ways to answer the question of what "implicating that Q" stands for. I think that for Grice it meant something like the subjective communication intention of S: By saying P in context C, S intended to convey the additional content that Q. In other words, grasping the implicated content consists in grasping some content that the speaker intended to convey. I am not entirely sure that this is what Grice had in mind, but given his overall linguistic framework, it is a very plausible assumption. However, it is doubtful that it is also the best option. On a more objective understanding of communicated content, we can think of the idea of implication in terms of commitments, rather than intentions. On this understanding, content that is conversationally implicated by saying P in C is the kind of content that the hearer can reasonably infer that the speaker is committed to by expressing P, given the relevant conversational maxims that are taken to apply. And of course it matters which one of these options we assume; the criteria for warranted inferences would vary accordingly. What we see in such cases is that a pragmatic inference can be defeated by the presence of some contextual facts, presumed to be common knowledge between speaker and hearer. Such contextual facts can either undercut the inference or, at other times, render the inference indeterminate or underspecified. And this should not be surprising.
After all, the determinants of a pragmatic inference include contextual background that is presumed to be common knowledge between speaker and hearer. When some of the background facts somehow conflict with the inference to implicated content, the inference might be defeated.
I mentioned earlier that the defeasibility of an inference is enabled by the fact that such inferences contain typicality premises. The inference is normally defeated when the superseding premise demonstrates that the usual or the typical fails to obtain in the here already entangled with some typicality premise in the background. It is a premise about reasons: The idea is that one would normally have no reason to mention in the same sentence two people doing something unless they were doing it together. Generally speaking, then, the idea is that we say things for reasons, and assumptions we make about typical (ordinary, common, etc.) reasons often play a role in the pragmatic inferences we draw from what we hear. Thus, generally, we would assume that if you say something like (2), you implicate that John and Mary went to Paris together. But now, if we happen to know (given their bitter divorce and all) that it is very unlikely that those two did anything together last summer, the typicality premise fails on this occasion. The hearer would still surmise that there must be a reason for the speaker to mention the pair in one sentence, but it is not the usual, typical reason; it must be something else. Similarly, in example (1), when a speaker singles out an individual from a set, we would assume that the individual is not a member of the set; otherwise, the speaker would have said too much. But again, the maxim of quantity comes into play here on the basis of the assumption that there are reasons to single out the individual from the set mentioned in the same sentence, and the most typical reason would be the intention to indicate (or to acknowledge) that the individual is not a member of the set. When it is common knowledge that the singled-out individual is a member of the set, the typicality premise fails; we can no longer rely on it. And I take it that very similar considerations apply to (3) as well. When a speaker says, "All X's who are F … ," we assume that for all the speaker knows there might be an X who is not F. When we know that the speaker believes that all X's are F, the typical reason to predicate the X's in this way fails on this occasion, and the assumption has to be that there is something else going on.
The fact that assumptions about typical reasons play a role in pragmatic inferences is of crucial importance. It explains why defeasibility can generate genuine indeterminacy. Generally speaking, reasons can come into conflict. They also have something we call a dimension of weight. When reasons conflict, we can often determine that one of the reasons outweighs the others in the circumstances. Indeterminacy comes about when conflicting reasons are on par with each other -either because they have roughly equal weight in the conflict, or else, perhaps, because they are incommensurably on par. In both cases, the situation is that no reason in the conflict outweighs the other. So we get indeterminate results. This simple model, I submit, explains why pragmatic inferences can be defeated in ways that neither rebut the initial conclusion nor undercut the initial evidence for it, but render the conclusion indeterminate.
Admittedly, a distinction exists between indeterminacy and under-determinacy.
Results are under-determined by some facts or evidence if the relevant facts do not provide sufficiently robust or unambiguous support for the particular result in question.
In other words, under-determinacy is a relation between premises/evidence and a under-determinacy and indeterminacy are logically independent aspects of an inference.
In practice, however, the former is often the reason for the latter. A particular result would be indeterminate relative to some relevant question, such as what exactly the utterance implicates in the circumstances about X, because the implicature about X is under-determined by the combination of the semantic and pragmatic inputs. Given the relevant semantic and pragmatic determinants in this case, the implicated content about X is neither here nor there, which is to say, the utterance is indeterminate about the implication of X. 12 There might be a fourth type of case that is unique to common law systems concerning the inferences courts draw from precedent and ways in which precedents are "distinguished". I will not discuss reasoning from precedent in this paper, it is complicated enough to deserve separate discussion.
Forms of Defeasibility in Law
Some presumptions, though not many, are not rebuttable. In effect, non-rebuttable presumptions amount to a legal stipulation that, for the relevant legal purposes, X counts as/or entails that Y. 13 Such rules are not really presumptions. When the law says that, for purposes P, X counts as Y, the law just stipulates a certain result, and like any other legal rule, if the antecedent conditions are met, the legal conclusion is to follow. There is nothing special about such cases; they do not rely on typicality premises.
Most legal presumptions, however, are recognized to be rebuttable. But again, not all rebuttable presumptions in law are of the same kind. Consider, for example, the famous, and obviously rebuttable, presumption of innocence. The legal presumption that a man is to be considered innocent until authoritatively proven to be guilty, functions as a rule about allocation of burden of proof: The rule imposes the burden on the prosecution to provide legally permissible evidence and positively prove the guilt of an indicted defendant. In other words, the so-called presumption of innocence is essentially a rule about the allocation of burdens of proof. 14 And it is just one among many such rules, often called presumptions. For example, there is a well-known (rebuttable) presumption in criminal law that a person intends the natural consequences of his action. What this rule essentially prescribes is, again, a matter of burden of proof. In order to show that the defendant on trial had the relevant criminal intention to X, the prosecution only needs to prove that the agent's action was such that its natural, typical consequence is X; the conclusion that in such cases the agent intended X is something that the prosecution does not need to adduce additional evidence about. The burden to rebut the conclusion is shifted to the defendant. The defendant needs to provide evidence and convince the court that, in spite of the natural consequence of his action, the consequence is not one that he intended to bring about. Many rules in law of evidence about shifting burdens of proof are defined in terms of rebuttable presumptions. It is a matter of convenience, entailing nothing special about the defeasibility of such rules.
13 Some types of sovereign immunity are legally defined as non-rebuttable presumptions, probably for rather archaic reasons. 14 Admittedly, there is also a colloquial understanding of this presumption that is very different from the legal one. In everyday, non-legal sense, the presumption of innocence is not a presumption at all, it is a kind of moral requirement to abstain from judgment about a person's guilt until proven otherwise.
Many other legal presumptions are rules of statutory interpretation. For example, a rule determines that statutory provisions formulated in the masculine are presumed to include the feminine, or a rule determining that a criminal offense is presumed to require mens rea. 15 These, and many other such presumptions, operate as default devices. They provide a general default that legislators and administrative agencies are free to deviate from, but they would need to do so explicitly, indicating the deviation from the default by some recognizable means. The formulation of such rules as rebuttable presumptions is essentially a technical device, a matter of convenience. It is like telling the legislature: If you want to prescribe X in circumstances C, you do not need to say so; we will assume that if C then X. Therefore, if you want the legal rule in C to prescribe that not-X, you need to say so. To the extent that such rules are defeasible, and of course they may be, their defeasibility has nothing to do with their formulation as presumptions. To sum up, we should not take the formulation of rules or legal doctrines in terms of rebuttable presumptions to indicate that such rules are somehow more defeasible than any other legal rule.
The general defeasibility of legal inferences would seem to be very closely tied to the second category I mentioned, namely, cases in which courts need to consider an exception to a legal rule. First, however, we need to narrow the issue here. Countless legal rules, at various levels of generality, have legally recognized exceptions, either originally contained within the relevant enactment or added later by the legislature or by the courts in their interpretative decisions. Either way, when a case concerns the putative applicability of a recognized exception to a legal rule, the role of the court is only to determine whether the conditions for the exception are met in the particular case at hand.
In this the role of the court is not different from any other type of case in which it needs to determine whether the conditions for the application of a rule obtain or not.
Defeasibility is thought to become the issue when we focus on the open-ended nature of possible exceptions to a legal rule. The thought is that perhaps any legal rule, whether it already has legally recognized exceptions or not, may become applicable to a situation that might justify an exception to the rule, and there is no way of determining all those possible situations in advance. Legal rules have exceptions that cannot be exhaustively stated ex ante. One way of expressing this idea is to say that legal rules are defeasible. Some justified exception to the rule might always come up that would defeat the rule's original verdict.
Let me say from the outset that I would not wish to object to the label of defeasibility here, but I want to explain why the logic of exceptions is different from the logic of defeasibility with respect to inferences that contain typicality premises. These are two distinct types of cases. Richard Holton has suggested a way of modeling exceptions to legal rules and, though I have some reservations about the scope of his account, I think that he is quite right to argue that the logic of open-ended exceptions to legal rules need not defy monotonicity. 16 I will try to show that monotonicity can be maintained here precisely because the inferences in question do not rely on typicality premises.
Something else is going on.
So what is the phenomenon in question? The idea is simple enough, and it is not unique to law. The idea is that, when we formulate a general normative prescription by way of a rule, we would normally recognize certain exceptions to the rule. So we can normally state in advance that "R: In circumstances C, all X ought to ϕ, unless conditions a, b or c obtain." It seems reasonable to assume that every plausible, justified or sensible rule would have some unless clauses attached. So far there is not much of a problem; we can think of the unless clauses as narrowing the scope of the rule, that is, providing a more fine-grained definition of its conditions of application. The problem comes about from recognizing that the unless clause of any plausible rule would have to be openended. We cannot formulate an unless clause that would state all the possible factors that would defeat the rule in question. But then the danger is that if the unless clause does not state all the defeating factors, it is bound to be vacuous or empty, like saying that the rule applies unless it turns out that it should not apply. That is not very helpful.
Now one can see why a non-monotonic logic would seem like a tempting model to apply here. 17 We could think of rules as implicitly but necessarily containing a typicality premise. So the idea would be that "R: In circumstances C, all X's ought to ϕ," actually says something like "R: In circumstances C, most/typical X's ought toand/or typically ought to -ϕ." The unless clause, on this model, is understood as an indication that the typicality premise may fail on any given occasion, in which case, the inference from the rule to its application may not be warranted on that occasion. But I think that Holton is quite right to argue that this model is not all that plausible. Even if we are willing to give up monotonicity, which is always a high price to pay, the model misconstrues the ways we normally think about legal rules. Consider, for example, the legal rule pacta sunt servanda, in common law meaning that a valid contractual obligation must either be performed or paid compensation if not. We recognize, of course, that there are bound to be some exceptions whereby a breach of a contractual obligation need not be compensated. And we may also recognize that there is no way of stating all the exceptions ex ante. But still, we would not think about the rule as premised on some typicality condition; we would not think that the content of the rule is that "typically or mostly contractual obligations need to honored." We would think that contractual obligations need to be performed (or compensated for non-performance) unless there is a good reason not to. So this is precisely the intuition that Holton aims to model. His model assumes that we can think of unless clauses as quantifying over other rules. A rule applies unless there is another (sound, justified) conflicting rule that renders the application of the first one wrong. 18 And then we need a suppression tool, which Holton calls "That's it,"
to indicate that the application of a rule in any given case presupposes that no justified superseding rule is relevant. A rule is defeated when the "That's it" clause is not warranted under the circumstances, namely, when there is some superseding rule that, under the circumstances, justifies the defeat of the rule in question.
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John Horty has developed a detailed and interesting account based on non-monotonic logic; see, for example, his "Reasons ad Defaults", Philosophers' Imprint, Vol 8, no 3 (2007). Horty's work is partly the target of Holton's argument about exceptions to legal rules. As will be seen below, in this particular context I side with Holton in this debate. 18 Holton's account is reminiscent of ways in which the concept of prima facie obligation has been thought of. The idea is that a prima facie obligation is a reason for action, such that failure to act on it is wrong unless there is a conflicting reason not to act on it that prevails in the circumstances. The account traces to W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, (Oxford, 1930) ch 2. I wish to remain agnostic about the plausibility of Holton's model with respect to moral rules. I am not sure that there are rules, strictly speaking, in the moral domain, and I am not sure that we can model the way we think about exceptions to moral rules by assuming that they all contain unless clauses that quantify over all other moral rules.
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Holton's model does seem more plausible, however, in the legal context, and precisely because it is different from the moral one, in two crucial respects: First, legal rules, unlike moral ones, typically have canonical formulations. Rules become part of the law by way of some enactment or other; they are enacted by a legislature or some administrative agency or, in the common-law system, by way of legal precedents decided by higher courts. Generally speaking, rules in the law, even rules at high levels of generality, tend to have some canonical, legally recognized, formulation. Second, and more important, exceptions to legal rules require authoritative determination, usually by the courts.
Exceptions to legal rules are not added by reason; they are added by authoritative judicial (and sometimes legislative) decisions. Thus, in the legal case, we can interpret the rules as implicitly containing a That's it clause, with the additional premise that the courts would normally have the legal power to revisit the That's it clause and add an exception to the rule that had not been previously recognized. The idea here is that courts typically have a kind of quasi-legislative power to add items to any list of an unless clause in a legal rule, thus modifying the conditions for the rule's applicability. In other words, precisely because, in the legal case, any addition to a list of unless items is a form of institutional, authoritative modification of the original rule, the That's it suppression makes some sense; there is some legal reality to it. Until a court authoritatively determines otherwise, legal actors must presume that existing exceptions to a given rule are not superseded by a legal argument; That's it, in the legal case, attaches to a legal rule's list of recognized exceptions, as an institutional matter. Only courts or other legal authorities have the power to determine that, in a given case, That's not it.
Be this as it may, I share a crucial intuition with Holton, at least with respect to legal rules. The intuition is that it would be wrong to infer from the open-endedness of possible justified exceptions to legal rules that the rules must implicitly contain some typicality premises. Some exceptions to this may exist. There might be some legal norms that are taken to capture typical or paradigmatic types of cases, defeasible in ways that typicality premises usually are. 20 Mostly, however, we understand legal rules to determine some results unless there is some conflict that justifies an exception. And even then, the exception would have no legal significance without being authoritatively recognized as such. A clear example of this way of thinking comes from cases in which the application of a legal rule in some peculiar set of circumstances yields patently absurd or unacceptable results. In some cases, courts would decide that the rule does not apply and thus create an exception, but, in others, they decline to modify the rule and apply it anyway (sometimes expressing the hope that the legislature will intervene and enact the requisite modification).
So what does the open-endedness of possible exceptions to legal rules amount to?
In the legal case, at least, the answer is that it is essentially a matter of legal authority.
Legal systems need to assign the authority to modify rules and adapt them to varying circumstances. Why? Because legal rules are enacted for reasons, aiming to achieve some particular purposes, and it may happen that the reasons for a given legal norm are either not well served by applying the law in a particular case of its putative application, or else they conflict with other reasons that apply. If law is to be responsive to reasons, it must have some mechanism that allows for adaptations and modifications of rules; somebody should have the authority to modify the laws when the relevant reasons call for a modification. In common-law systems, this authority is usually vested in the courts.
Courts get the power to determine which exceptions to legal rules to recognize, and their power in this respect is, indeed, pretty much open-ended. If we want to call this aspect of legal reasoning defeasibility, so be it. It is a different kind of defeasibility, however, from what I will describe in the next section.
Conflicting Defeats in Law
Elsewhere I argued in some detail that an act of legislation is a collective speech act, and that the legal content of enacted law is the content communicated by the speech act in question. 21 As with other cases of linguistic communication, the content conveyed by a speaker is often pragmatically enriched content. The hearer's ability to grasp the pragmatically enriched content involves a defeasible inference from the semantic content of the expression used, its syntax, the factual context that is common knowledge between speaker and hearer, and the relevant normative framework governing the conversation in question. We have already seen why pragmatic inferences tend to be defeasible, and I argued that some pragmatic defeats are of the conflicting kind, rendering the authority, the FDA may have no choice but to prohibit the sale of tobacco products entirely. 24 Obviously, the FDA wanted to avoid this legal result, and argued in its briefs that it had legal ways to avoid banning the sale of tobacco entirely, even if regulation of tobacco products were to fall within its jurisdiction and were found to be harmful. The argument about this particular point was rather ingenious, but a bit too much so. The courts did not buy it, and proceeded to examine the legal question with the assumption that if they found the FDA to have the authority to regulate tobacco products, the FDA would have little choice but to prohibit their sale altogether.
So far, so good; it seems to be an easy case, at least from a linguistic perspective.
The relevant section of the law gives the FDA a very wide authority to regulate any product that is "intended to affect the structure or any function of the body." Surely cigarettes and other tobacco products fall within the extension of this expression. Congress may or may not have intended -that tobacco products fall within the 24 That is so, because the FDCA created two separate regulatory schemes for products (other than foods and cosmetics) that purport to have some medicinal benefits and those that do not. If a product is claimed by its manufacturer to have some medicinal benefit, the FDA needs to conduct a series of hearings, based on scientific research, to determine whether to approve the product or not. However, if the manufacturer does not claim any medicinal benefit with respect to a given product, which is clearly the case with tobacco products, and the product proves to be harmful, the FDA must prohibit its sale.
jurisdiction of the FDA, and, consequently, due to other parts of the statute, and the fact that tobacco products are undeniably harmful, it follows that the FDA must ban their sale. Now, it is a widely accepted principle of democratic legislation that Congress has the authority to amend or modify its previous laws. Therefore, the real question here is whether the later pieces of legislation, regulating the sale and advertisement of tobacco products, actually withdrew the putative authority of the FDA to ban tobacco products or not. Remember that these later pieces of legislation would seem to clearly implicate, even if they do not quite say so, that the sale of tobacco products is legal. But here is exactly where we run into trouble. The contextual background of these later pieces of legislation is muddled; when they were enacted, the FDA did not claim authority to regulate tobacco products. The question of whether the FDA might claim such authority, and whether it would have it, was hanging in the air, suspected by legislators over the relevant years but not established. In fact, Congress attempted to pass legislation in both directions, explicitly granting and explicitly withdrawing such authority, that failed to pass. In other words, the contextual background was one of uncertainty. Given this background, the inference from the enactments regulating the sale and advertisement of tobacco to the implication that the FDA has no authority to ban the sale is defeated. But notice that the defeat is not of a rebutting kind. The contextual uncertainty does not rebut the putative implication of those laws; it only renders them inherently uncertain.
A second example is West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey, 25 a textbook case for textualism in action, in which Justice Scalia, writing for the court's majority opinion, reasoned to the decision on linguistic grounds. Casey stems from a civil suit filed by the hospital of West Virginia University against the Medicaid system adopted by the state of Pennsylvania, concerning remuneration of Medicaid costs for out-of-state services, which, the hospital claimed, was in violation of federal and constitutional law.
The hospital prevailed at the trial court and pursuant to the provision of a federal statute was awarded the cost of its attorney's fees, which included the cost of expert fees paid by what the dissenting justices argued here is that the pragmatic inference Scalia had in mind is defeated by the context and the purpose of the legislative speech act in this case. Given the reasons the legislature had in enacting this provision, the inference is rebutted.
So the background here is a bit more muddled than the dissent's view would have it. I would suggest that the defeat here is, again, of the conflicting kind. It leaves the implication defeated but not rebutted. From a linguistic perspective, the result is indeterminacy.
Some readers may resist this last conclusion. People may think that if we just knew enough about the circumstances of the legislation and the intentions of those involved in its production, we would know the right answer. But this is wrong. First, remember that it is an objectified sense of uptake that we must consider here. The question is not directly about the intentions or purposes of various agents involved in the process of legislation; it is a question about pragmatic commitments. Knowing all the relevant contextual background, what would a reasonable hearer infer? The simple point is that, even if all the relevant background is known, the inference to some particular aspects of the communicated content might remain genuinely indeterminate. 27 Suppose, for example, that the truth of the matter about the legislation of the act in Casey is that the drafters just made a mistake; they forgot that other pieces of similar legislation refer explicitly to expert fees. But suppose that they actually intended to include them. Still, this would not necessarily settle the issue. There is no contradiction in suggesting that, by saying that X in circumstances C, the speaker intended to convey that Y, but failed to do so.
More generally, it is very important not to conflate two distinct questions here:
What are the criteria of success for an act of communication? And what is the content that has actually been communicated on an occasion of speech? It is very plausible to assume that an act of communication (fully) succeeds when, and only when, the hearer has fully grasped the content that the speaker intended to convey by his or her utterance.
In this sense, it is clearly true that the criteria of success for an act of communication are reducible to the relation between the content that the speaker intended to convey and the hearer's actual uptake. Therefore, even in case of doubt, we can say that there is a truth of Given this objective framework of pragmatic inferences, I hope it becomes clearer why conflicting defeats result in genuine indeterminacy and not some factual uncertainty.
When we face some uncertainty about a result we would be warranted in assuming that 
